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In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes its 
disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of a home firm approaches infinitely 
close to that of a foreign firm. In the framework of the Bel1rand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and 
Grossman[ 1986] showed that an export tax is preferable to an export subsidy. In th is paper, it is 
shown that an export subsidy is preferable to an export tax in some cases in the framework of 
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many 
economists have mentioned a non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution to this has 
not yet been shown, and so the optimum solution is shown in this paper. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Under a condition of international oligopoly, a country's trade profit can be increased 
by expand ing its production volume. Additional rent for an exporting firm brought by expansion 
of product ion volume increases a country's trade profit . Individual governments thus tend to 
protect and foster domestic industries, with the intent of capturing and increas ing rents. Then, in 
the case of price competition, a govemment subsidy works to decrease the social profit of the 
home country through the transfer of rent. In this case, a trade tax will increase the profit of the 
home country. 
To clarify the econom ic effectiveness of strateg ic trade policy under such conditions, 
now we assume a case in which each firm competes in a Bertrand-type price framework, 
considering uncertainty in demand based on Klemperer and Meyer [1986].; Production by 
domestic and foreign firms is exported entirely to third countries, i.e., none of the firms' 
production is consumed in either country . We also assume that products are substitutable. 
Initial work in this area was done by Brander and Spencer [1985]; their model has 
been extended by Eaton and Grossman [1986]. The basic idea behind a strategic trade policy in 
the case of price competition is as follows. First, we consider the case of free trade. In F igure 1, 
point EO shows the Bertrand-Nash equil ibrium, which is the intersection of reaction functions 
for the home and foreign firms. Point Et indicates the Stackelberg equilibr ium on which a home 
firm can maximize its profit, existing on the iso-profit curve, 7ft. If a home finn is a 
Stackelberg leader, it is possib le to reach point Et. However, a foreign firm is in the same 
situation . As the two finns confront the same conditions, it is impossible to identify a 
Stackelberg leader. 
Despite this constraint, if the marginal costs of the home firm increase, it will increase 
its price irrespective of the price level of the foreign firm. Government can reduce the firm's 
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incentive to produce by levying tax. If the government chooses an appropriate tax level, the 
home firm can now attain the Stackelberg equilibrium.;; In Figure I, the reaction function of the 
home firm shifts down and to the right, showing the influence of the government tax. (This 
shows the case of linear tax.) 
The home country's trade profits can be obtained as export profits of the home firm 
minus the government tax. The iso-profit curve of the home firm under free trade at point EO, 
the Stackelberg equilibrium, is equivalent to the trade profits of the home country at point Et. 
Under the above scenario, a government can maximize the home country's trade profits by 
levying tax. 
Eaton and Grossman [1986] showed that an export subsidy is preferable in Cournot 
type competition if the conjectural variation of the home firm is larger than the consistent 
conjecture. They also showed that the export tax is preferable in Bertrand competition if the 
conjectural variation of the home firm is smaller than the consistent conjecture. 
Klemperer and Meyer [ 1986 and 1989] introduced the uncertainty into demand. They 
showed that finns choose quantity (price) to control in competition if the cost curve is convex or 
rather concave (concave or rather convex).Therefore, the market conduct should be 
Cournot-type and Bertrand-type under the assumption of uncertainty in demand. 
Qiu [1995] studied the non-linear subsidy using this classification.;;; He assumed that 
the cost curve is a quadratic form of production volume and the constant term is zero. Then, the 
subsidy is assumed to be a quadratic function of production volume. Firstly, if the slope of the 
marginal cost curve is negative, it should be changed to zero by the subsidy. Secondly, 
subsidization is conducted to attain an optimum point. In the latter case, the subsidy should be 
the same amount for any production unit. 
In this paper, it is assumed that the cost curve is a quadratic form of production 
volume and the slope of the marginal cost curve is negative. Then, it is also assumed that the 
absolute value of the slope of the marginal cost curve is rather large and the market conduct is 
2 
Bertrand type, based on the classification of Klemperer and Meyer [1 986]. 
It is shown that we can find a case in which an export subsidy IS preferable in 
Bertrand-type competition in this paper. When a government subsidizes a home firm, the price 
of it will increase. Then, compared with the case of Eaton and Grossman [1986], it becomes 
possible for a government to increase the home country's trade profit. 
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11 TAX AND CHANGES IN THE REACTION FUNCTION 
Here, we assume the demand function of the home firm as follows. 
x = -ap + bP + e (a> O,b > O,e > 0) 
p: price of home firm 
P: price of foreign firm 
The cost function of the home firm is assumed as follows. 
X2 
e = dT+ e x  + f 
Therefore, the profit function of the home firm is as follows. 
n(p,p)=P'X(p,P)-e(x) +s'x(p,P) 
s: subsidy or tax for the home firm 
The reaction function of home firm is obtained by maximization as follows. 
(-ap + bP + e) +( -a)p -(dx + e)(-a) + s( -a) = 0 
Therefore, the reaction function of the home firm is as follows. 
= 
b(l +ad) P + c+acd+ae _ _ s_ (1) P a(2+ad) a(2+ad) (2+ad) 
Now, we assume that the reaction function of the foreign firm is as follows. 
P=Ap+B (2) 
4 
p 
r 
E' 1 .� � EO�· 
.� 
�--------�------------------p 
Foreign firm 
Figure 2 
R(Foreign) 
Then, the subsidy is now assumed to be zero. By solving equation (I) and (2), we 
obtain the equilibrium point EO under free trade as follows. 
{ 1 J [ 
(C + acd + ae + ac + a2cd + a2e) 
J p = ae2 + ad) 
. Ab (1 + ad) 
ae2 + ad) _ Abel + ad) 
+ c + acd + ae 
p = A(c+acd+ae) 
a(2+ad)-Ab(1 +ad) 
(3) 
(4) 
If the reaction function of the home firm approaches gradually and infinitely close to 
that of the foreign firm while keeping its distance constant, the new equilibrium point E* can be 
obtained. As shown in the appendix, if a segment approaches infinitely close to another segment, 
the intersection approaches to a certain point. 
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In this paper, it is assumed that the reaction function of the foreign firm does not 
change in response to changes in the home firm's reaction function; instead, it remains in the 
same position. 
III THE HOME FIRM'S REACTION FUNCTION IS SHIFTED 
BY TAX 
If the home government levies a constant tax t per unit of production, the reaction 
function ofthe home firm can be described as follows. 
= b(1+ad) P 
+ c+acd+ae a + _t_ (5) P a(Z+ad) a(Z+ad) (2+ad) 
We assume that the reaction function of the foreign firm is as follows. 
P=Ap+B (6) 
Intersection of these reaction functions is as follows by the solutions of(5) and (6). 
p = {a(2 � ad)} 
[ 
(e + aed + ae + ae + aZed + aZe) 
. Ab (1 + ad) a(2 + ad) - Ab(1 + ad) 
P = A(c+acd+ae+at*) 
a(2+ad)-Ab(1 +ad) 
+ e + aed + ae + at *] 
(7) 
(8) 
Because the demand function of the home firm is x = -ap + bP + e, production of 
the home firm is as follows. 
x = -ax{ 1 } . [Ab (1 + ad) (c+acd+ae+ac+a
2
cd+a
2
e) + e + aed + ae + at *] I a(Z+ad) a(Z+ad)-Ab(1+ad) 
+b A(c+acd+ae+at*) +c (9) a(Z+ad)-Ab(1+ad) 
Therefore, total tax for the home firm becomes as follows. 
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T=t*x( -ax{ 1 }. [Ab (1 + ad) 
(c+acd+ae+ac+a2cd+a
2
e) + c + acd + ae + at *] a(2+ad) a(2+ad)-Ab(1+ad) 
+b A(c+acd+ae+at*) +c )  ( 10) 
a(2+ad)-Ab(l +ad) 
Because the optimum tax is already obtained by Eaton and Grossman [1986], this 
value is supposed as given (t*). 
111-2 THE HOME FIRM'S REACTION FUNCTION APPROACHES INFINITELY 
CLOSE TO THE FOREIGN FIRM'S REACTION FUNCTION 
We assume that the home government levies the tax to manipulate not only the 
constant coefficient d in the marginal cost of the home firm, dx+e, but also the coefficient e. In 
this case, the home finn's reaction function can be made to approach infinitely close to the 
foreign firm's reaction function. Equations (I)' and (2), are equalized at the limit. When we 
assume the coefficient of p and constant coefficient are identical in equations (I)' and (2)", we 
obtain equations ( 1 1) and (12). 
= b(1+ad) p + c+acd+ae (I)' P a(2+ad) a(2+ad) 
Now, we assume that the reaction function of foreign firm is as follows. 
P=Ap+B 
P B 
p=--­
A A 
(2)' 
(2)" 
It is possible to obtain the values of d and e (marginal cost dx+e) at the limit by 
solving these two equations.iv 
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d = A c + 2aB + ---'-----,--------'--• (2a-bA) -1 { (2a-bA)(AC+Ba2 ) } 
a(Ab-a) Aa a(Ab -a) 
• 
( _} ) { 
( 2a -bA) ( A c + Ba2 )} 
e = - Ac + 2aB + 
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The amount of the subsidy in this case can be obtained as follows . 
f� {( d -d* ) x+ ( e-e* )}dx ( 13) 
As the home reaction function approaches the foreign reaction function, the marginal 
cost curve, dx+e, approaches the marginal cost curve, d*x+e*. As explained in the appendix, the 
length of segment AB should be equal to the length of segment A*B*. Therefore, the triangle 
AA *RO refers to the subsidy, and the triangle ROCR * refers to the tax. The Stackelberg 
equilibrium obtained by Eaton and Grossman [1986] is the point R*(E*). According to the 
appendix, when the point R*(E*) is given, the segment is determined. In this case, the 
Stackelberg equilibrium obtained by Eaton and Grossman [1986] is obtained by subsidy not by 
tax, because the area of triangle AA *RO is larger than the triangle ROCR *. It is possible to say 
that subsidy is preferable under the price competition in this case. 
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IV SUMMARY 
Eaton and Grossman [\986] showed that an export subsidy is preferable In 
Cournot-type competition and that the export tax is preferable in Bertrand competition. 
In this paper, it has been shown that we can find a case in which an export subsidy is 
preferable in Bertrand-type competition, considering uncertainty in demand based on Klemperer 
and Meyer [\986]. When a government pays a subsidy to the home firm, the prices of the two 
firms increase and productions decrease. Then, the home firm can attain the Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
Historically, many economists have mentioned non-linear subsidies. However, the 
optimum solution for it had not yet been shown. The optimum solution was shown in this paper. 
10 
Q 
q 
p 
p 
FigureS 
APPENDIX 
A 
a 
In Figure 5, it is assumed that segment PQ approaches segment AB. Then, the length 
of PQ should be held equal to the length of segment AB when segment PQ comes sufficiently 
close. 
x y 
Segment PQ satisfies - + � = 1 Segment AB satisfies 
p q 
The intersection of two segments is as follows. 
a p( b - q ) bq (a - p) 
oX = , r = -----
bp-aq " aq-bp 
Here, the next relationship is used. 
2 2+b2_q2 P =a 
11 
x Y �+-=1. 
a b 
As a result, the next equation should hold. 
If the numerator and denominator of the x component of intersection are multiplied by 
(bp+aq), the following relationship is obtained. 
ap(b-q) bp+ aq) ap( b - q )(bp+aq) ap(bp+aq) 
X= b?p1 _a?q2 = (a2 +b2)(b? _q�) = (a2 + b2 )(b+q ) 
When point P approaches point A and point Q approaches point B, 
p � a, q � b, the x component of intersect ion approaches 
3 
a 
In a similar manner, the limit of the y component of intersection can be obtained. As a 
result, the l imit of intersection should be as follows. 
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NOTES 
i According to Klemperer and Meyer [1986], if a cost function is convex or rather concave, 
quantitative competition is chosen. If a cost function is concave or rather convex, price 
competition is chosen. This result came from the variation of uncertainty, e, which is an 
intercept ofthe y-axis of the demand function. 
ii In this case, p rices of both firms increase and production volumes decrease. However, 
the home firm can increase its profit. 
iii Qiu [95] studied the non-linear subsidy. However, the idea of equilibrium in this 
paper is different from his idea of equilibrium_ 
iv Desp ite the length of the segments, all segments approach segments located on the 
same line. 
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